THE WORLD IS THE STAGE – A GLOBAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

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A security strategy is a policy-making tool which, on the basis of given values and interests, outlines long-term overall objectives to be achieved and the basic categories of instruments to be applied to that end. It serves as a reference framework for day-to-day policy-making in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment.

The absence of an explicit strategy need not be a problem if all those involved in policy-making share the same basic views and can thus easily reach a consensus on policies that fit within these general guidelines, even if they are not explicitly written down. But with regard to the external policies of the EU, distributed among all three EU pillars, this is clearly not the case, in particular in areas covered by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its military instrument, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Member States hold widely divergent views as to the ambitions of the Union as a player on the international stage, the desirable degree of EU autonomy and the instruments and capabilities the Union should develop. There is no common strategic vision behind the existing – but incomplete – consensus on the need to develop more effective military capabilities for the EU. As a consequence, EU external policy lacks direction, determination and consistency. Faced with the initiatives of a dominant global player, the US, that is both very determined and very powerful and does possess an explicit strategy – the National Security Strategy adopted in September 2002 –, the EU is necessarily restricted to a reactive role. Without a clear security strategy of its own, the EU cannot escape the American framework of thought and promote its own policy priorities in terms of both objectives and instruments. Therefore the taboo on strategic thinking at European level needs to be broken and the strategic concepts of the individual Member States – some more, others less elaborate – aligned.

A security strategy would not only provide the reference framework that is needed for day-to-day policy-making – and that should determine the instruments and capabilities that are being developed, rather than the other way around – but would also bring political benefits.\(^1\) If consensus can be found on the Union’s general approach to security and on what it will and will not do, those Member States that are now reluctant about the Union’s security dimension,

out of resistance against a perceived ‘militarisation’ of the EU’s external policy or for fear of undermining the transatlantic alliance, might be persuaded to fully support converting the Union into an effective international player. Of course, one can question the degree to which some of the larger Member States, even those that are playing the European card, are really willing to ‘Europeanise’ their security policies. Will they stop at the technical level of pooling capabilities for efficiency purposes, or will they be willing to accept the full implications, in terms of national policy-making and sovereignty, of their demands for a stronger and therefore more unified Europe? In any event, a security strategy would provide a clear framework for policy-making and thus render unilateral action more difficult. Such a step might also alleviate the misgivings among the EU’s neighbours about a build-up of military capacity which in their view lacks clear objectives, and could thus very well be directed against them. Finally, the adoption of a security strategy would increase the openness and democratic legitimacy that are needed to gain the vital support of public opinion.

At the informal meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Greece on 2 and 3 May 2003, Javier Solana was – rather unexpectedly – tasked with producing a draft strategic document. This historic decision ended the taboo on strategic thinking that emerged in 1998 when, at the moment of launching the development of an EU military capacity, it was expressly decided to circumvent the strategic issue in order not to undermine the momentum that existed at the time. At its meeting in Thessaloniki (19-20 June), the European Council welcomed the document submitted by Solana, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, and charged him with taking the work forward with a view to submitting an EU security strategy at the European Council meeting in December 2003.

Building on work done by the authors as part of a research project on ‘A European Security Concept for the 21st Century’, the purpose of this paper is to offer an appraisal of Solana’s

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2 In the words of Commissioner Pascal Lamy: ‘No State, no national parliament would accept to act through the Union if the debate on objectives and principles has not taken place’ (authors’ translation). The European Convention, Working Group VII on External Action, Working Document 10, 15 October 2002, p. 9.
4 The ‘European Security Concept for the 21st Century’, a study carried out by the Royal Institute for International Relations (a think-tank associated with the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), is available at http://www.irri-kiib.be/papers/SecConcept%20Outline%20EN.pdf.
Section 2 outlines developments in the security environment and analyses the threat assessment in the Solana document, arriving at a definition in which direct military threats rank below multifaceted, systemic threats to the world order as such. Section 3 gives an overview of the ongoing efforts to define a new approach to security in response to this new environment; it highlights the continuity there has been from the earliest attempts to elaborate a different approach within the CSCE up to the 2003 EU exercise. Section 4 further demonstrates that a distinctive approach is in fact already emerging, as can be deduced from the analysis of current EU policies. Section 5 then assesses the strategic objectives and corresponding capabilities put forward in the Solana document and offers suggestions for making the strategy operational. The ‘European way’ resulting from these suggestions, the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ and its implications for EU policy are proposed in detail in section 6. The last section summarises the assessment of the Solana document with reference to the US National Security Strategy.

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5 The authors wish to thank all members of the department’s informal working group on European security.
I - THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Security is ‘the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; […] a feeling of safety or freedom from or absence of danger’.\textsuperscript{6} Also described as ‘freedom from fear’, security thus clearly contains a subjective element, an element of perception. The latter part of the definition can also be expressed as ‘confidence in the future’, which has a more positive ring to it. Since there are many kinds of danger, security is by nature a very broad concept that comprises several dimensions. Security policy can be defined as a policy aiming to keep an object, in this case the values and interests of the EU, safe. Traditionally, security policy was associated only with the use of politico-military instruments.\textsuperscript{7} Defence policy is the aspect of security policy that has to do with self-defence against acts of aggression.

During the cold war, Europe’s security was essentially defined in military terms, as the avoidance of direct military danger by a clearly identified foe. This unidimensional definition was a product of the bipolar constellation, in which Europe’s security was deemed to hinge on avoiding armed conflict on the European continent by maintaining a nuclear and politico-military balance of power between the US and the Soviet Union. So European security policy was forged under American leadership, mostly within the framework of NATO, and was essentially limited to defence policy. The non-military dimensions of security were regarded as being of much less consequence, as were developments in other parts of the world. There was a tendency to develop security policy without taking other external policy aspects into consideration, even to dominate them.

\textsuperscript{6} Oxford English Dictionary.
\textsuperscript{7} Politico-military instruments comprise, \textit{inter alia}, mechanisms for early warning and peaceful settlement of disputes; confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs), political dialogue and military cooperation; non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament; preventive diplomacy; sanction regimes; observer, humanitarian, peacekeeping, police and peace enforcement operations (which can be summarised under the general heading of peace support operations and which include a civil dimension); and defence operations.
The end of the cold war produced a drastic change in Europe’s security environment. The collapse of the Soviet bloc and of the Soviet Union itself meant the end of a direct and major military threat to Europe’s security, i.e. one that could threaten the very survival of the EU. Accordingly, defence policy became less important. The EU Member States had long ceased being a threat to one another, and through enlargement the deeply integrated European ‘security community’ was to be extended to central and eastern Europe. But the end of the cold war also triggered a wave of inter- and intra-State armed conflicts in the vicinity of the EU. Although they have not threatened it directly, they have produced negative spill-over effects. In these conflicts, the civilian population has been targeted more than ever before. And a much more diffuse threat is now posed by international terrorism. The issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their means of delivery is closely intertwined with both developments.

In the absence of a major military threat, other factors that can constitute the underlying causes of terrorism or of armed conflict between or within third States, or that can intrinsically affect the values and interests of the EU, have come much more to the fore: organised crime, illegal immigration, social and economic underdevelopment, lack of democratic institutions and respect for human rights, failed States, dysfunctioning multilateral institutions, ecological problems etc. These factors are much more difficult to grasp than the previous clearly identifiable threat. Another element is the growing awareness of the importance of values in international relations, such as democracy and respect for human rights and an effective international legal order. The number of international players – State and non-State, legal and illegal – has increased too. Security is evidently becoming a multidimensional concept.

The background to this shifting importance of security factors is globalisation. At global level, interdependence has proven to be more than economic; it also has political, cultural and security aspects. As a consequence of globalisation, itself a source of tensions between those that benefit from it and those that suffer its negative effects, Europe’s interests are inseparably linked to the stability of its worldwide interaction with other players, and vice versa. This interdependency implies that events anywhere in the world can have an immediate impact on Europe – there no longer is a fixed correlation between the importance of developments for European security and their geographical distance from the Union. It further means that the security of one is dependent upon the security of the other, hence the need for multilateral
cooperation. In effect therefore, the security of Europe nowadays is dependent on the stability of the international system as such.

This new security environment is the starting point for the Solana document, which highlights the contrast between a Europe that ‘has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free’ and the issues of concern in a globalised world, notably regional conflicts, poverty, bad governance, the rise in temperatures and energy dependence. It thus recognises the multidimensional nature of security. The document emphasises that ‘as a union of 25 States with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s gross national product (GNP), the European Union is, like it or not, a global actor’ that ‘should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security’, while noting at the same time that already in recent years ‘European forces have been deployed abroad more often than in any previous decade’.

The document then focuses on what are dubbed ‘three key threats’:

- international terrorism, which, ‘lack[ing] the constraints of traditional terrorist organisations’, seems to be ‘willing to use unlimited violence’ and in its most recent manifestation ‘is linked to violent religious fundamentalism’;
- proliferation of WMDs, ‘the single most important threat to peace and security among nations’, which in ‘the most frightening scenario’ could be acquired by terrorist groups;
- failed States that are often taken over by organised crime, the activities of which affect European security.

Is this emphasis on terrorism and WMDs not exaggerated? It certainly reflects the current trend: ‘9/11’ has led to a renewed emphasis on defence. First of all in the US, as is evident from its National Security Strategy. But also in the EU: proposals in the draft constitution aim to introduce a ‘solidarity clause’, which would provide for the use of ESDP mechanisms and assets within the territory of the Union in case of terrorist attack, and the possibility of closer cooperation on mutual defence. In this connection, the Solana document has been described as the EU ‘unambiguously re-calibrat[ing] its priorities to match those of the US’.  

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Terrorism and proliferation of WMDs certainly are the most important remaining direct threats to the EU, for ‘large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable’, as Solana points out. That does not mean that by themselves these threats are likely to materialise, however. The fact remains that most terrorist groups have a domestic agenda and are therefore unlikely to target the EU. A far bigger threat seems to be posed by internal, European terrorism. The likelihood that the Union will be targeted by international terrorism is further lessened by the fact that its non-confrontational policies, in the Middle East for instance, present little cause for the anger and frustration that can create a fertile recruiting ground for potential terrorists. The threat would indeed be increased if a terrorist group were to acquire WMDs, but none has done so yet. This demonstrates the importance of effective non-proliferation, but should not lead to alarmism. The only parties involved that do currently possess WMDs are therefore States. In their case, the danger is even more limited: no State, apart from the Union’s allies, has the means to mount a full-scale offensive and pose any serious threat. Besides, the use of WMDs would imply the risk of massive retaliation, by conventional means or otherwise. But the main argument is that in view of the Union’s economic might it is hard to imagine which State would not damage its own interests by an act of aggression against the EU.9

Instead of terrorism and WMDs, the most important threat emerging from the new security environment seems to be the ever growing gap between haves and have-nots, or rather haves and have-lesses, of which the global concerns mentioned by Solana – regional conflicts, poverty etc. – are all symptoms. Foremost among these, because it threatens the stability of the international system itself, is the fact that, at a certain level of inequality, the resulting political upheaval, extremisms of all kinds, economic uncertainty and migration flows will become uncontrollable – as Europe already experienced once, in the 1930s. Against this background of globalisation, specific politico-military challenges do indeed stand out. They include regions of chronic tension and long-standing disputes and conflicts, failed States and civil wars, proliferation of WMDs and excessive militarisation, and terrorism. These challenges directly threaten other regions and States. But on account of spill-over effects and the challenge that they pose to international stability, they also indirectly affect the EU. They have to be tackled head-on, but as they are symptoms of the ‘dark side of globalisation’, effective global governance must also be pursued at the same time as the key to preventing

such threats. Of course, the strength of the causal relationship between, on the one hand, the
gap between haves and have-lesses in the broadest sense and, on the other hand, specific
polito-military issues differs from case to case. Nonetheless, in the long term no durable
settlement of such issues can be achieved unless the stability of the world system itself is
assured.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{10} At the three seminars on the Solana paper that the EU has organised, in Rome, Paris and Stockholm, the
general feeling was also that the ‘new threats’ are over-emphasised.
II - SEARCHING FOR NEW APPROACHES TO SECURITY

The EU initiative to define a security strategy is not the first attempt at recasting the concept of security. In response to the changing security environment and new assessment of security threats, a number of States and international organisations have sought new ways to deal with security – ways that go beyond the State-centric and the defence and politico-military approach. The use of politico-military instruments can deal effectively with immediate security threats, by ending violence or preventing its eruption, but the underlying causes of instability, conflict and terrorism demand a much broader, long-term and permanent policy of conflict prevention. ‘9/11’ has demonstrated that possession of the greatest military might on earth, including the most advanced technology, cannot by itself guarantee security.

One ‘new’ approach to security that involves the EU Member States dates back to the beginning of the Helsinki process in 1973: the comprehensive view of security taken by the CSCE (now the OSCE), which is reflected in the three baskets of the Helsinki Final Act. The OSCE considers ‘the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, along with economic and environmental cooperation [...]’, to be just as important for the maintenance of peace and stability as politico-military issues’. Security is seen as indivisible. ‘States have a common stake in the security of Europe and should therefore cooperate’, to the benefit of all parties, since ‘insecurity in one State or region can affect the well-being of all’.

This cooperative approach to security amounts to inclusiveness or ‘institutionalised consent’: security policy is aimed at reassuring third countries, through cooperation in a wide range of fields, rather than deterring them. In practice the OSCE has focussed on a number of specific items and instruments which have proved very successful, including confidence and security-building measures, peaceful settlement of disputes, election-monitoring and minority rights. Thanks to its pan-European membership, the OSCE also contributes to disseminating the comprehensive and cooperative approach to security.

Through their membership of the OSCE, the newly independent countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, for instance, have become familiar with this approach and its underlying values.

In 1995, a first limited attempt to draft a European security strategy was undertaken within the framework of the Western European Union (WEU). Under the resulting ‘common concept’ the WEU States ‘acknowledged that their security is indivisible, that a comprehensive approach should underlie the concept of security and that cooperative mechanisms should be applied in order to promote security and stability in the whole of the continent’. It stressed ‘Europe’s new responsibilities in a strategic environment in which Europe’s security is not confined to security in Europe’, and described the security environment, highlighting inter alia the importance of ‘the maintenance of international peace and order and the widest possible observance of generally recognised norms of conduct between States’ and of ‘democratic institutions, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law’, as well as the need to ‘prevent economic imbalances from becoming a threat to our continent’. In terms of how to deal with this new environment, however, the document was limited to an assessment of Europe’s military capabilities and the identification of partners for cooperation. A real review of strategy proved to be politically unfeasible because of divisions between the Member States. Nevertheless, as the first official European assessment of the changing security environment, it was an important and all too easily forgotten step.

The concept of human security is usually thought to have originated in the 1994 Human Development Report. It is also very much present in the report drawn up by Koffi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, in preparation for the September 2000 Millennium Summit. Human security takes the individual and his community as point of reference, rather than the State, by addressing both military and non-military threats to the latter’s security. The security of the State is not an end in itself, but a means of – and necessary precondition for – providing security for people. Indeed, the State itself can be the source of the insecurity of its citizens. Territorial integrity, traditionally the cornerstone of security policy, is less important. Human life and dignity are the keywords. The UNDP lists seven dimensions of security: economic,
food, health, environmental, personal, community and political. This very broad and therefore unwieldy definition, with ‘vulnerability’ as its defining feature, is supported by Japan, one of the proponents of human security.

Another ‘school of thought’ limits human security to ‘vulnerability to physical violence during conflict’.\(^\text{17}\) This is the view held by Canada, for example, which under the leadership of former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy became one of the leading promoters of human security. Canada defines human security as ‘freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety or lives’: i.e. ‘freedom from fear’ as opposed to ‘freedom from want’, the latter corresponding to well-being rather than security.\(^\text{18}\) Canada has identified five policy priorities – protection of civilians, peace support operations, conflict prevention, governance and accountability, and public safety – reflected in a focus on a number of specific items including landmines, the International Criminal Court, women and children in armed conflict, small arms proliferation and child soldiers.\(^\text{19}\) In the Canadian view, the pursuit of human security can involve the use of military power. This was also the conclusion of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), established by Canada within the framework of the UN General Assembly to look into the concept of humanitarian intervention. The commission identified as a basic principle that ‘where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or State failure, and the State in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect’, including, under strict conditions and if authorised by the Security Council, by military means.\(^\text{20}\)

Like comprehensive security, human security highlights the interconnections between different dimensions of security. It also underlines the global nature of security challenges, which results in mutual vulnerability. Human security therefore requires comprehensive and

cooperative responses. While comprehensive security raises the question ‘which threats to our security?’, human security adds ‘whose security?’ It is geared to attaining justice and emancipation, not just order and stability. The Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific, a non-governmental grouping of Western and Asian think-tanks, has attempted to merge the two approaches by including the individual level in its acceptance of comprehensive security, defined as the ‘pursuit of sustainable security in all fields (personal, political, economic, social, cultural, military, environmental) in both the domestic and external spheres, essentially through cooperative means’.  

For its part, the Council of Europe has developed the concept of democratic security, building on the assumption that armed conflict between democracies is unlikely and aiming to protect the individual by guaranteeing the rule of law and respect for human rights. At the first Council of Europe Summit of Heads of State and Government, Member States declared that ‘the end of the division of Europe offers an historic opportunity to consolidate peace and stability on the continent. All our countries are committed to pluralist and parliamentary democracy, the indivisibility and universality of human rights, the rule of law and a common cultural heritage enriched by its diversity. Europe can thus become a vast area of democratic security’.  

In that it reflects the need to maintain the stability of the international system, comprehensive security can be linked to another concept that emerged in the context of the UN at the end of the 1990s: global public goods (GPGs). Public goods are characterised by non-rivalry in consumption and non-excludability. Global public goods provide benefits that are ‘quasi universal in terms of countries (covering more than one group of countries), people (accruing to several, preferably all, population groups), and generations (extending to both current and future generations, or at least meeting the needs of current generations without foreclosing development options for future generations)’. GPGs can be grouped under the following broad headings:

- international stability and security, for which the greatest powers have to carry the greatest responsibility;

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- an open and inclusive economic world system that meets the needs of all, in particular the poorest, so as to enable all to participate fully in decision-making;
- an international legal order which ensures the equality of all;
- global welfare as the global equivalent of national human security systems, which provides for basic services for all;
- a shared commitment to combat pockets of lawlessness.  

GPGs are strongly interrelated: one cannot be ensured without the other. Global stability, and therefore the security of all States, depends on the availability of sufficient access to GPGs; an excessive gap between haves and have-nots will lead to destabilisation. Indeed, it is often only when a threat to the global order is perceived that such deficiencies are taken seriously. An international system that fails to provide the core GPGs, as a State should do at national level, lacks legitimacy, hence the need for effective global governance. The idea of promoting global governance in order to increase access to GPGs is prevalent in the UN’s Millennium Goals. GPGs are usually seen in the context of development, but currently the concept is also being used in more general political terms, by Joseph Nye for instance.

This overview of the ongoing reconceptualisation of security highlights the continuity stretching from the origins of the CSCE, one of the first major endeavours to forge a common and autonomous European approach to foreign and security policy, right up to the Solana document. All of these exercises have yielded similar conclusions: only a comprehensive security concept can provide an effective response to the new security environment. Several States and organisations have attempted to implement this approach and integrate aspects of it in their policies. The EU, as a sui generis organisation, with a foreign and security policy that has a global scope and covers all dimensions of international relations, now has the opportunity to adopt the comprehensive approach as the foundation of its external policy.

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24 This is the definition arrived at by the Royal Institute, which under the heading ‘Global Governance: the Next Frontier’ is also elaborating a concept of global governance.
The recent developments in American strategic thinking have gone in precisely the opposite direction. From merely being reaffirmed when the Bush administration came into office, the traditional ‘neo-con’ concepts of national sovereignty, national interest and the balance of power became the cornerstones of US policy after ‘9/11’. In the EU as well, ‘9/11’ brought about a certain renewed emphasis on defence, as reflected in the proposals to introduce a ‘solidarity clause’ and closer cooperation on mutual defence, but defence issues did not push the comprehensive approach to security off the agenda – quite the contrary.

27 ‘Mr Man Patten is busy, busy, busy!’. In: European Voice, 27 March 2003.
Voices in favour of a new approach to security were raised in the European Convention, although Working Group VIII on defence dealt primarily with institutions and capabilities. For instance, Dr Wim Van Eekelen, the former WEU Secretary-General, called for the formulation of a strategic concept which ‘would develop the notions of comprehensive security, including conflict prevention, democracy building and economic development and also cooperative security with neighbouring regions, but – in order to be credible – should also contain a military capability underpinning the policies of the Union’.\textsuperscript{28} In an introductory note for the benefit of the members of Working Group VIII, the Convention Secretariat put forward the concept of ‘comprehensive crisis management’, which integrates instruments from all three pillars.\textsuperscript{29} The final report of Working Group VIII states that ‘the concept of security is very broad, by nature indivisible, and one that goes beyond the purely military aspects covering not only the security of States but also the security of citizens.’ On the basis of this broad concept of security, the CFSP and the ESDP which forms part of it promote international security founded on multilateral solutions and respect for international law. Conflict prevention is a key element in the approach followed by the Union in international relations. The ESDP allows the Union military options over and above the civil instruments of crisis prevention and management.’\textsuperscript{30}

Elements of comprehensive/multidimensional and cooperative/multilateral approaches to security can already be found in EU policies. Along lines similar to the concept of GPG, in its Communication on Conflict Prevention\textsuperscript{31} the Commission proposes to address the ‘root causes of conflict’ by promoting ‘structural stability’, defined as ‘sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures and healthy environmental and social conditions, with the capacity to manage change without resort to conflict’. However, in the EU, GPGs are only explicitly mentioned in the context of economic globalisation and sustainable development. The EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent

\textsuperscript{29} European Convention, Working Group VIII on Defence, Working Document 6, 10 October 2002, p. 2.
Conflicts\textsuperscript{32} that is based on the above communication calls for an integrated policy surpassing the pillar structure and defines conflict prevention as a priority for all of the Union’s external policies. It also lists EU instruments for both long-term structural prevention and short-term direct prevention. The EU has now developed instruments such as the Country and Regional Strategy Papers, which outline policy priorities, the Check-List for Root Causes of Conflict and the continually revised Watch List of Priority Countries (countries where there is a serious risk of conflict). But what the Union is lacking is a conceptual dimension that brings its range of external policies together and can serve as a framework for the necessary integrated approach.

A comprehensive approach to security is particularly characteristic of EU policy with respect to neighbouring States, which it attempts to integrate in an encompassing network of relations: the Stability Pact for the Balkans, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), and the successful transition of central and eastern Europe, probably the most significant European achievement since the start of the European integration project itself. This approach, under the heading ‘Neighbourhood Policy’, was recently promoted by the Commission as an enhanced framework for relations between the Union and its neighbours.\textsuperscript{33} The Neighbourhood Policy aims to achieve an ‘area of shared prosperity and values’ by creating close partnerships with the Union’s neighbouring States, which should lead to in-depth economic integration, close political and cultural relations and a joint responsibility for conflict prevention. To that end, the Union is to offer very concrete ‘benefits’, in the fields of market access and investments for example, which should be linked to progress made towards political and economic reform in the neighbouring States.

When confronted with acute crises such as the one in Iraq, the Union more often than not fails to achieve consensus on how to respond. As a result, little or no effective action is taken – hence the need to define a strategic concept as a framework for dealing with crisis situations. The EU operation in the Congo, ‘Artemis’, even though it was of limited duration and geographical scope, but certainly not of limited risk, has demonstrated that the EU can act decisively if the political will is there. When it comes to long-term commitments, however, the comprehensive and cooperative approach to security does seem to emerge as the

\textsuperscript{32} Adopted by the European Council at its meeting in Göteborg, 15-16 June 2001.
predominant characteristic of most areas of the EU’s external action. Yet it needs to be substantiated and policy areas need to be integrated in order to arrive at a framework for a consistent, coherent and effective policy. Keukeleire calls these spheres of EU action ‘the structural foreign policy’ of the EU. They are less visible than traditional diplomacy and ‘high politics’, but nonetheless represent a huge and often very successful effort on the part of the Union. A similar picture emerges from Bretherton and Vogler’s major study of the EU as global actor. The EU’s profile in these areas corresponds to the view of the Union as a ‘civilian power’, i.e. a player that seeks to influence the international environment in the long term – that has ‘milieu’ rather than ‘possession goals’ – mainly through economic, diplomatic and ideological power and via multilateralism, and that is inspired not only by material interests, but also by norms and ideas.

The Union’s differentiated response to ‘9/11’, which focuses on the underlying causes of terrorism, is another example of this approach. The extraordinary European Council meeting of 21 September 2001 called for ‘an in-depth political dialogue with those countries and regions of the world in which terrorism comes into being’ and ‘the integration of all countries into a fair world system of security, prosperity and improved development’. More recently, the EU position on the Iraqi crisis further illustrated the Union’s preference for exhausting all non-coercive options before resorting to the use of force. At an extraordinary meeting on 17 February 2003 the European Council stated that ‘force should be used only as a last resort’ and emphasised the importance of reinvigorating the Middle East peace process if peace and stability are to be brought to the region. France, Germany and Belgium went furthest in implementing this view. ‘9/11’ was therefore not a turning point for the EU’s external policy. Rather it served to confirm the view that a policy that focuses exclusively on military means cannot achieve long-term stability or ensure national security. ‘9/11’ and the events that followed, notably the declaration of a war on terrorism and the invasion of Iraq, did nonetheless highlight the major differences between the EU’s and the Bush administration’s views on how to achieve security.

Undoubtedly, ‘9/11’ and Iraq influenced Member States’ willingness to consider an exercise in strategic thinking, though the various States may have had differing motivations: defining a distinctive ‘European way’ for some, aligning priorities with those of the US for others, or a combination of both, reconciling the drafting of the EU agenda with the need for continued transatlantic partnership. The important point is that this enabled the decisive step to launch a strategic debate in the Union.
IV - TOWARDS AN EU SECURITY STRATEGY

The Solana document puts forward a dual strategy for the EU in response to the new security environment. As it is an outline that needs to be fleshed out, the document naturally sums up the principles and broad objectives for EU policies without going into extensive detail.

Europe’s neighbourhood

On the one hand the document points out that the EU must extend the zone of security around Europe, for ‘even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important’ and conflicts, weak States, etc., on our borders produce spill-over effects for the EU. Therefore ‘a ring of well-governed countries’ must be established, ‘with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations’: the Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, the Southern Caucasus, and the Mediterranean (where resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority).

It is indeed true that, while the security issues arising in the Union’s vicinity are global phenomena that are not specific to this region, their potential effects on the EU are greater because of the geographical proximity. The EU and its neighbourhood, and in particular its neighbours on the European continent, can be considered a ‘security complex’ as defined by Buzan: ‘a group of States whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another’. Therefore, in this area the onus is on the EU to assume responsibility and take the lead: a stable neighbourhood is a necessity for our own security and promoting stability in our area is our duty, since we are the local player with the means to do so. Through its force of attraction, the EU has succeeded in stabilising the European continent; now it has to replicate that success in a wider neighbourhood.

The most suitable instrument to that end would be the comprehensive Neighbourhood Policy proposed by the Commission. The concrete benefits offered in that framework, besides aiming to promote economic and political reform via conditional assistance – and thus having

a broad preventive scope – could also be linked to substantial politico-military cooperation, in order to establish joint mechanisms for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. The Neighbourhood Policy will have to strike a balance between bilateral action plans, so that benefits and benchmarks for progress can be tailored to specific needs and circumstances, and multilateral partnerships such as the EMP, in order to deal with regional issues and promote regional integration between partners. For the Neighbourhood Policy to succeed, the Member States will have to muster the necessary political will to invest sufficient means and offer the neighbouring States real benefits.\textsuperscript{39} Otherwise, it will suffer the same fate as the ‘old’ EMP (which actually already contains a lot of these measures): well-intentioned principles, but limited implementation. In the long term, if it is successful, the Neighbourhood Policy could, through permanent close interaction and sharing of norms and values, lead to the progressive emergence of new ‘security communities’\textsuperscript{40} encompassing the EU – a ‘security community’ in itself that is expanding through enlargement – and the neighbouring regions or sub-regions.

The Neighbourhood Policy’s overall objectives would thus be:
- preventing conflicts in our neighbourhood and acts of aggression against the EU;
- settling ongoing disputes and conflicts;
- establishing close economic and political partnerships based on shared values, prosperity and security;
- controlling migration and all forms of illegal trafficking into the EU;
- protecting the security of EU citizens living abroad.

With regard to Russia in particular, which is a strategic partner of the Union at global level but is also vital to security on the European continent, closer political and security dialogue and concrete cooperation could be sought. The adoption of a new common strategy that sets priority objectives and details instruments and means, including the necessary institutions, could add substance to the current partnership. As for the Mediterranean, a deepening of the EMP’s politico-military strand could be achieved through partners’ active participation in the

\textsuperscript{40} Adler & Barnett define a ‘pluralistic security community’, that can evolve from ‘loosely’ to ‘tightly coupled’ as ‘a transnational region comprised of sovereign States whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change’. (Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett (eds.), ‘Security Communities’. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998).
ESDP. This would also dispel their misgivings about it. Another objective would be the creation of a Middle East area free of WMDs. But this implies that the EU must contribute actively to a settlement of the conflict in the Middle East, as a necessary prerequisite for the partner countries to engage in security cooperation. Likewise, the Union should support a settlement for the Western Sahara, make use of the association agreement to engage in a critical dialogue with Algeria and encourage Libya to accept the Barcelona *acquis* and join the EMP. Among the members of the EMP, Turkey stands out as a vital partner with which the EU can establish practical politico-military cooperation, pending the settlement of the Cyprus issue. Finally, a more systematic partnership with sub-Saharan Africa could be envisaged; in the politico-military field the EU could contribute to the creation of a permanent African stabilisation force.

**The global level and the new threats**

Secondly, the Solana document states that our security depends ‘on an effective multilateral system’ and therefore calls for ‘a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order’. At the centre must be the UN, which must be equipped ‘to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively’. Other key institutions for global governance are the WTO, the international financial institutions, the ICC and regional organisations such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union. Finally, all dimensions of good governance must also be promoted at State level. The approach advocated to achieve global governance and counter the key threats, which are again set out in a separate paragraph, is one of ‘pre-emptive engagement’, since ‘conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early’, through ‘a mixture of instruments’, for ‘none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means’. This mixture comprises, among other measures, promoting the rule of law and respect for human rights; trade and development, in combination with conditionality; and the readiness to act when multilateral commitments are not complied with or when States place themselves outside international society.

With regard to WMDs in particular, this approach has already been developed in the ‘Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, which were endorsed by the Council on 16 June 2003. The Basic Principles provide for two stages. The first includes strengthening the multilateral non-proliferation treaties and export control regimes, notably with regard to verification, and dealing with the underlying causes of proliferation by pursuing political solutions to tensions and disputes and regional arrangements for arms control and disarmament. Only when these instruments have failed, can ‘coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law’ be envisaged. The Security Council is to play a central part, which implies that its role ‘as the final arbiter on the consequences of non-compliance […] needs to be effectively strengthened’.

Under the heading ‘pre-emptive engagement’, the Solana document thus proposes a very broad approach, including with respect to the ‘new threats’. In order to avoid confusion, it would perhaps have been better to choose a different heading, avoiding the term ‘pre-emptive’, which is prone to misinterpretation. Effective global governance, i.e. a system that can provide the core GPGs, is the best way of preventing security threats from materialising – hence the need to reinforce multilateral institutions. In the politico-military field alone, several measures could be taken to that end, including the following:

- Strengthening the decision-making mechanisms of the UN and providing it with stand-by forces, in order to create an effective crisis management capacity.
- Setting up a UN counter-terrorism agency that coordinates the work of the various UN, regional and national bodies active in the fight against terrorism.
- Contributing to the building of local conflict prevention mechanisms and crisis management capabilities in key regions, such as central Africa.
- Reinforcing the verification mechanisms of the non-proliferation treaties and export control regimes and establishing a counter-proliferation committee under the Security Council to monitor compliance with relevant agreements and resolutions.
- Collectively defining common criteria, adapted to today’s security environment, for the use of coercive measures, military and other, in order to provide a response to States that do not live up to their commitments – vis-à-vis the international community as well as their own population – and to counter threats at an early stage. In this respect, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) has done ground-breaking work by assessing the circumstances under which the
The principle of non-intervention must yield to the international community’s responsibility to protect. The Secretary-General has already announced the establishment of a high-level ‘Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’ to formulate recommendations on these issues.

- Promoting regional integration in order to consolidate peaceful relations between States and strengthen States’ position in the global order, so as to improve their access to GPGs.

This exercise must be repeated for the other dimensions of global governance, i.e. the other core GPGs.

In addition to reinforced multilateral institutions, this approach requires an integrated EU policy that links partnership and cooperation with States and regions in a wide range of fields, which thus have a wide and permanent preventive scope, to compliance with political (human rights, rule of law, democratisation) and politico-military (non-proliferation, defensive posture) commitments. It also implies that the EU must develop instruments to respond to cases in which States do not live up to their commitments, including in particular a catalogue of effective sanctions that can be put to use in specific circumstances. Permanent monitoring of potentially destabilising events must provide the basis for early warning and conflict prevention, using the whole range of instruments available to the EU, including sanctions and non-coercive use of military instruments (e.g. observer and peacekeeping missions and interventions at the request of State authorities).

The coercive use of military power must be a last resort in the European approach to security. It should be considered only if all other means have clearly failed, and subject to an explicit mandate from the Security Council. But if these conditions are met, the European Union should have no hesitation in taking military action. If, however, the Security Council – whose authorisation should in all cases be sought prior to action being taken – proves unable to act in a situation where the responsibility to protect is obvious, then, as the ICISS has outlined, the consent of the UN General Assembly can be sought at a meeting in emergency special session under the Uniting for Peace procedure, or action within its area of jurisdiction by a regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter can be envisaged, subject to it seeking subsequent authorisation from the Security Council. But the purpose in this case cannot be to authorise pre-emptive coercive military action on the initiative of the European Union or its
Member States. Since Article 51 of the UN Charter allows military action by way of self-defence only after an armed attack occurs, the Security Council is the only body that can legally – and legitimately – decide on any other form of coercive military action. Any deviation from this rule, by allowing States to determine the need for coercive military action, would pave the way for a complete dismantling of the Charter and the multilateral system.

This stance implies the need to strengthen the decision-making capacity and legitimacy of the Security Council. If the Security Council is indeed to be ‘the final arbiter on the consequences of non-compliance’, then it must be given the means for effective action. The necessary reforms include curtailing veto powers and amending the composition of the Security Council to make it more representative and thus more legitimate – a necessary prerequisite for the success of the collective security system. With two of its Member States having a permanent seat, the key is to a large extent in the Union’s hands. If the will can be mustered to replace these seats with a single EU one, it will give the Union the legitimacy to demand further reforms.

**Instruments and means**

Lastly, the Solana document identifies the implications of this proposed strategic orientation in terms of instruments and means. The document calls for a Union that is ‘more active’, i.e. ‘able to sustain several operations simultaneously’, with ‘a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention’; that is ‘more coherent’, for ‘in a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command’; and that is ‘more capable’, which implies inter alia more resources for defence and systematic use of pooled and shared assets. This Union should be ‘working with partners’: international organisations and key actors and regions. Among these, ‘the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable’, for ‘acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world’. The EU must also develop ‘strategic partnerships’ with Russia, Japan, China, Canada and India.

In the global environment, politico-military power does indeed play a more prominent role than on the European continent, so there is no escaping the fact that projection of military power, within the bounds of the UN Charter, may be necessary to ensure peace and stability. An effective military instrument, and the willingness to use it, are necessary assets to enhance
the credibility of the EU as a player on the international stage. As the Solana document puts it: ‘a European Union which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight in all situations, even where military or civilian intervention is not contemplated’. Given Member States’ limited resources and pressing social and economic needs on the one hand, and the current duplication of capabilities between them on the other hand, the only way to enhance the Union’s military capabilities in an efficient way seems to be through further integration of national armed forces. This can be pursued through the creation of a European operational headquarters or cell, and through multinational cooperation, pooling of means and task specialisation around cores of excellence, on the basis of planning at the European level. This would provide the European Union with an enhanced catalogue of capabilities that makes use of the full potential of Member States’ armed forces and to which each Member State contributes its fair share. It would enable the European Union and its Member States to field more rapid reaction forces, that are capable of implementing the full range of Petersberg tasks on any scale, in all of the three possible scenarios: NATO operations, EU operations using NATO assets and EU-only operations – the latter requiring an EU capability for operational planning. Policy-making has to be underpinned by effective European arrangements for sharing and gathering intelligence and by reinforcing the capabilities for permanent monitoring, early warning and rapid decision-making.

Overcoming the dark side of globalisation requires the cooperation of all States. Great powers have the greatest responsibility for projecting stability in the world. It follows that a comprehensive and equitable transatlantic partnership is indispensable to promote global governance. In the politico-military field, the transatlantic partnership is embodied in NATO. Now that it has the necessary institutional and military capabilities at its disposal to act autonomously, the EU can itself implement military operations to support its global and neighbourhood policy and it can assume first-level responsibility in the event of crises in its vicinity. Such burden-sharing would contribute to transform NATO into an equitable, two-pillar alliance, in which both partners have responsibilities and can call upon the alliance and its assets according to pre-arranged mechanisms. The overarching NATO level would be activated only if the means of one of the pillars turned out to be insufficient to resolve a crisis or if the EU and the US agreed, for political reasons, to be jointly involved in an operation from the very beginning. In such a constellation, non-participation in an operation by the other pillar need no longer automatically be considered a breach of solidarity. The level activated – NATO or one of the pillars – would depend on whether both pillars consent on the
proposed intervention or not. This implies that the pro-active, global role for NATO that is being envisaged in some circles is far from automatic. In the case of threats to the territorial integrity of either partner, however, the mutual defence commitment under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty provides the ultimate security guarantee. An EU-US division of labour along the lines of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power, as suggested by some,\(^{42}\) makes no sense: either player needs to implement both an effective and a legitimate foreign policy.

The UN, which provides the primary global security framework, is the centre-piece of the multilateral system. Besides strengthening its institutions and capabilities, the EU should also deepen its already close partnership with the UN in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management, in particular through intelligence-sharing and coordination of policy-making and capability-building. Likewise, close coordination of policies with regard to the European continent and the Mediterranean would make the EU and the OSCE truly complementary.

**Security within the EU**

A level that is not mentioned in the Solana document is that of security within the EU. Of course, the Member States no longer pose any threat to each other. By strengthening the existing web of political, economic, social and military interdependence between current and, further to enlargement, future Member States, the Union is continuing to build an area of freedom, security and justice. But the Union’s territory and population remain vulnerable to global threats. To enhance the confidence of Europe’s population, the EU and its Member States have equipped themselves with new instruments, such as the European arrest warrant, a common definition of terrorism and Eurojust. The effectiveness of these developments will be further enhanced by enabling full harmonisation of policies in areas commonly agreed upon, in particular terrorism, human trafficking, drugs trafficking, corruption, euro counterfeiting, arms trafficking, money laundering and organised crime.

The adoption of a ‘solidarity clause’ will signal the move of the EU Member States towards a political community, committing themselves to mutual help and assistance in the face of risks of all nature. For the foreseeable future, the EU and its Member States no longer face any

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\(^{42}\) Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain’. In: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, 2003, No. 4, pp. 74-89.
direct military threat to their territorial integrity. The mutual defence commitments to which
the Member States are bound, including the possibility of closer cooperation on mutual
defence in the framework of the EU, serve as a long-term insurance against possible future
threats. EU policy with respect to neighbouring regions and at global level must prevent such
threats from materialising in the first place.
V - COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY AS AN EU CONCEPT

Solana’s outline for an EU security strategy clearly builds on the ‘European way’ in international relations that is emerging from current EU policies, and especially from the Union’s long-term conflict prevention efforts and partnership arrangements. What a security strategy would do is bring these policies together within a conceptual framework that would establish a link between the various external policies of the Union, including short-term conflict prevention and crisis management. These are the areas where the EU today too often lacks a common approach, as the Iraqi crisis so forcibly demonstrated. This conceptual framework emerging from existing policies can be referred to as comprehensive security.

A comprehensive security strategy starts with the recognition that there are various security dimensions in the current international environment and therefore that the underlying causes of potential threats to the security of the EU are very diverse in terms of both nature and origin. Kirchner and Sperling dub this ‘the new security agenda’. It is concerned with the ability to protect the social and economic fabric of society, to act as gatekeeper between desirable and undesirable interactions and to foster a stable international economic and political environment. This agenda goes beyond the military dimension, which nonetheless remains a vital element, so for Kirchner and Sperling ‘a broader, holistic definition of the relationship between the “new” and “traditional” conceptualisations of security’ is required.43

Because of the multidimensional nature of security, achieving the overall objective of safeguarding the values and interests of the EU is equally dependent on the specific politico-military and on the broader global governance dimensions of external policy, i.e.:

- ensuring the continued absence of a direct military threat to the EU itself and avoiding spill-over effects of conflicts between or within third States to the EU;
- maintaining the stability of the Union’s neighbourhood and of the international system as such.

To achieve this, a comprehensive security strategy gives priority to active prevention of conflict and instability as opposed to a reactive and curative approach, which would be much more costly in both human and economic terms.\(^{44}\) GPGs are the angle from which prevention can be tackled in the most encompassing and fundamental way. At the level of regions, States and individuals, insufficient access to GPGs provokes tensions and armed conflict and, in case of a major deficiency, can destabilise the international system as such. Prevention must therefore aim to safeguard and improve access to GPGs worldwide, in the interests not only of the Union but also of human beings everywhere. In that sense, working towards GPGs can also be said to be a responsibility of the Union.\(^{45}\) Accordingly, rather than being threat-based, a comprehensive security strategy is a positive approach that aims at achieving positive objectives: GPGs. ‘What for?’ rather than ‘against whom?’ is the question that determines policy. A comprehensive security strategy will thus be able to avoid the classic security pitfall of over-emphasising threats, thus leading to unnecessary military build-ups and in return provoking distrust and military measures on the part of others.\(^{46}\) In the terms used by Buzan, comprehensive security amounts to an ‘international security strategy’, i.e. a strategy addressing the root causes of threats by trying to change ‘the systemic conditions that influence the way in which States make each other feel more (or less) secure’, as opposed to a ‘national security strategy’, aimed at reducing one’s own vulnerability by taking defensive measures.

A comprehensive security strategy looks beyond the traditional confines of security policy, i.e. beyond the use of politico-military instruments: it aims to implement, in an integrated way, a range of external policies, which together offer a broad set of instruments that have a worldwide scope and that address the different dimensions of security. This range of policies covers all three pillars of the Union; it includes \emph{inter alia} external trade, development cooperation, international environmental policy, international police, justice and intelligence cooperation, immigration policy, foreign policy (multilateral diplomacy and the promotion of the values of the EU) and politico-military measures. The overall objective of this range of


\(^{45}\) Or, as the Commission suggests in its Communication on Conflict Prevention (p. 5): ‘Given the importance of the EU on the international scene, its interests and ambitions and the considerable resources it has committed to assistance and cooperation, there is no doubt that the EU should play its part in these efforts’.

policies, which functions as an integrating mechanism, is the promotion of the core GPGs. ‘Traditional’ security policy can thus be seen as one aspect of a much broader, integrated framework in which it is on the same level as the other external policies of the Union, thereby avoiding a ‘compartmentalisation’ of external policies. Within the overall objective of promoting GPGs, these policies all operate according to their own rationale and dynamic. In doing so, they contribute to a permanent or structural policy of prevention and stabilisation, and thus to the security of the Union. At the same time, ‘securitisation’ or ‘militarisation’ of external policies other than security policy is avoided, i.e. specific politico-military concerns and means do not determine overall policy in other fields of external action, which would otherwise be detrimental to the legitimacy of EU policies.

Such a strategy operates through dialogue, cooperation, partnership and institutionalised, rule-based *multilateralism* – itself an important global public good. Third States and organisations are regarded as partners for cooperation rather than as mere subjects of EU policies; the aim is to influence rather than to coerce, to use the carrot rather than the stick. But partnership and cooperation cannot be unconditional: benefits granted are linked to progress made in pre-defined fields. A critical dialogue is maintained with partners that do not respect their commitments; if they persist, they will pay the price in their relations with the Union. Coercion is regarded as a last resort. It is not out of the question, but will only be used if all other options have been exhausted and, of course, within the bounds of international law.

The comprehensive security concept complies with the definition of the EU as a ‘civilian power’, as Smith⁴⁷, for instance, claims: the question is *when*, under what circumstances, and not *if* force can be used. This is in line with Maull’s definition of civilian power as including military power ‘as a residual instrument’.⁴⁸ Without the willingness to apply pressure, sanctions and, if need be, force, EU external action will not acquire the credibility it needs to be effective. This leads Stavridis to the assertion that ‘thanks to the militarising of the Union,

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the latter might at long last be able to act as a real civilian power in the world’. In that regard, the concept ‘civilian superpower’ is gaining currency. Keukeleire too concludes that what he terms ‘structural foreign policy’ can be effective only ‘if it goes hand in hand with an effective traditional foreign policy which can be supported by military instruments’. The deciding factor is that since it acquired a military capacity, the EU still presents itself, not as a ‘traditional’ power, but as ‘a power which is unique because it will be able to use military means as an integrated part of a much broader range of political, economic and diplomatic means’. ‘Comprehensive security’ seems a term better suited to the EU than ‘civilian power’, however, as it emphasises the integration of instruments and avoids the paralysing debate on the validity of the claim to ‘civilian power-status’ when possessing a military dimension that is inherent in the literature on the latter.

There will be cases where the use of force will be inevitable, for ‘modern’ nation States and ‘pre-modern’ regions of incompletely functioning States operate according to other rules than ‘postmodern’ Europe, in the terms used by Cooper to describe the world order. For any such EU action to be successful, legitimacy is a necessary prerequisite; this legitimacy will be strengthened by implementing a permanent policy aimed at promoting GPGs. Partnership can be built on the common aspiration to strengthen GPGs, in the mutual interest of all concerned. That is precisely the nature of GPGs. In that sense, comprehensive and cooperative security are inextricably linked. The objectives of a comprehensive security strategy can be realised only through cooperation, and cooperation and partnership cannot rely on the politico-military dimension alone, but require a broad base. Any use of force must always be put in the wider context of the prospect of – renewed – partnership and cooperation. In parts of the world where ‘the law of the jungle reigns’, as Cooper puts it, we must be prepared to act accordingly, but not without the aim of changing those laws and bringing the States or regions concerned within the area of partnership and cooperation.

This division within the literature on ‘civilian power’ is already apparent in the earliest authors’ writings. Whereas the ‘founder’, Duchène, used the term ‘civilian power’ to refer to the EEC, which did not possess a military capacity at all, Maull applied the concept to Germany and Japan, which do have armed forces. (François Duchène, ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’. In: Richard Mayne, ‘Europe Tomorrow’. London, Fontana, 1972).
The success of any security strategy depends on *the will to take action*. The EU must be prepared to invest the necessary financial means in effective partnership and cooperation and in developing its own policy instruments, and must also be prepared and able to implement those instruments, including, if need be, the coercive use of military means. What counts is not so much the size of the armed forces, but the willingness and ability to use them.\(^{54}\) The EU need not, therefore, strive for a military capacity equal to that of the US, but must carefully plan its capability needs according to its security strategy, abandoning the all too simple logic of ever more troops and equipment and daring to downsize overcapacities in certain areas.\(^{55}\) Through the Headline Goal process, national armed forces can be recast into rapidly deployable and sustainable capabilities. ‘Artemis’ serves as an example of the potential of a determined EU.

In other words, this need for a will to act is tantamount to the need for the EU to behave as a global power. Or, in the words of the Laeken Declaration adopted by the European Council at its meeting in December 2001: ‘a power wanting to change the course of world affairs […]’. For the EU to become a power, it must have the will and the capacity to weigh on the course of international events and influence the other players on the international stage. The EU and its Member States must consciously and collectively muster the will to form one of the poles of a multipolar world and pursue their own distinctive policy: comprehensive security.

A security strategy along these lines would be comprehensive or encompassing in a number of ways:

- In terms of policy objectives, by working towards GPGs.
- In terms of policy instruments, by integrating several policy fields in order to be able to use a wide range of instruments. Rather than working only on specific aspects of human security, GPGs etc. in an ad hoc way, the comprehensive security approach offers a fundamental concept underlying, and thus integrating all of the Union’s external policies.\(^{56}\)

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\(^{54}\) Christoph Bertram, ‘Europe’s Best Interest: Staying Close to Number One’. In: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 2003, No. 1, pp. 61-70.


\(^{56}\) The key elements of comprehensive security are – sometimes in different forms – also included in Ehrhart’s ‘cooperative security provider model’, but the integrating element is a vital distinction. (Hans-Georg Ehrhart, ‘What Model for CFSP?’ EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper No. 55, 2002).
- In terms of the subjects of policy, which include individuals: on the one hand the security of the Union’s citizens at home and abroad is included in the interests that have to be secured; on the other hand the access of individuals worldwide to GPGs is the long-term objective of all of the Union’s external policies – hence a clear link with ‘human security’, but without ignoring the importance of States and international organisations.

- In terms of its worldwide scope, which does not detract from the fact that the EU has a specific responsibility with regard to its neighbourhood.

- In terms of its inclusion of third States and organisations in policy-making, through multilateral cooperation and partnership, instead of considering them to be just subjects of EU policy.

Comprehensive security in effect translates the principles on which the EU itself is founded – liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law – into the principles underlying the Union’s external policies.
CONCLUSION

The Solana document is an outline; the next step is a fully-fledged security strategy. That it draws on a comprehensive concept of security is obvious firstly from its assessment of the new security environment, particularly in its designation of poverty and bad governance as being at the heart of problems, and secondly from its call for a strengthening of the international order through policies that make use of the complete range of instruments available to the EU, thus exploiting to the full its variegated facets. The conceptual framework can still be strengthened though, in order to provide a clear and powerful link between diverse external policy areas, between policies vis-à-vis various regions etc. The concept of GPGs can provide the key in this respect.

Further debates on the document, which will hopefully go into more detail as to the instruments required to make the security strategy operational, should take into account the comprehensive approach at that level as well, by detailing the EU’s idea of partnership and conditionality, of institutionalised, rule-based multilateralism, of the use of force etc. With regard to the latter issue, an explicit reference to the authority of the Security Council and rejection of pre-emptive military action seems desirable, in view of the role-model function of the EU. Such a reference would also increase the legitimacy of the EU’s external policy. It would also seem advisable to soften the emphasis on threats in the current document, which contrasts somewhat with the de facto comprehensive approach that the outline advocates. This comprehensive stamp can be given more substance by further developing the other dimensions of global governance, such as the international economy or legal order. These actually have a higher profile – albeit as instruments of security policy – in the US National Security Strategy. To that end extensive use can be made of existing EU policies and documents in the various areas of external action. Finally, the nature of a renewed transatlantic partnership could be outlined in more detail.

Another important consideration is the legal status to be given to the security strategy. To ensure that it will function effectively as the framework for the whole of the EU’s external policy, it might be worth stipulating that future action plans and CFSP and Community
instruments relating to external action must refer to the security strategy. Ideally, the security strategy as framework for external action should be mentioned in the future Constitution.

Of course, a comprehensive security strategy contrasts with the US National Security Strategy and certainly with recent US policies. The Solana outline and the National Security Strategy share an emphasis on threats. Threats are the dominant theme throughout the US document; all policy areas are considered in the light of the fight against proliferation of WMDs and ‘rogue States’ and particularly of the ‘war’ against terrorism – a struggle that ‘will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over a long period of time’ –, referred to as ‘our strategic priority’. On the contrary, the Solana document, when it comes to dealing with these threats, advocates a much more positive and comprehensive approach. As one diplomat put it: according to the American document, the world is dangerous; according to the Solana document, the world is complex. In the National Security Strategy, the emphasis is on defence policy and the use of military means, including pre-emptively. The US document also exudes unilateralism: even though the text is peppered with references to ‘allies and friends’, it makes it clear that these are expected to accept US leadership and that the US ‘will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require’. The EU is barely mentioned. It is primarily seen as ‘our partner in opening world trade’ and even though the US ‘welcome[s] our European allies’ efforts to forge a greater foreign policy and defence identity within the EU’, the basic concern is ‘to ensure that these developments work with NATO’.

Yet, the EU security strategy should not be interpreted as being directed against the US. On the contrary, the EU and the US should aim to reinforce the transatlantic partnership in all fields of external policy, not just in NATO, in order to put their combined means to use in the most efficient and effective way ‘for good in the world’, in the words of Javier Solana. But this should be an equitable partnership, one which both partners enter into on the basis of their own priorities and their own distinctive approaches to security. In this respect as well, the first step is to define an EU security strategy.

57 There is a minority school in international law that has a wider interpretation of Article 51, claiming it to include the possibility of pre-emptive action in case of an imminent attack, i.e. at a time between the moment when an enemy is perceived to be about to attack and the actual launching of that attack, and even then only if there is an urgent necessity of self-defence against this attack and there is no alternative to self-defence. The National Security Strategy goes a lot further by allowing ‘anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack’, a formulation that appears to do away with the condition of the ‘imminence’ of an attack; in effect, this is not pre-emptive action, but preventive war.
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